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In this article, the effect of IT knowledge on the overconfidence of venture capitalists (VCs) in their IT invest-
ments is examined.  Our findings show that the effect of IT knowledge on overconfidence is nonlinear.  VCs with
moderate levels of IT knowledge are least overconfident.  At the same time, VCs with moderate levels of IT
knowledge are most resistant to the biasing effects of past successes.  Past failures show a negative association
with overconfidence independent of the level of the VC’s IT knowledge.  Finally, the negative association
between stakes and VC overconfidence is stronger with greater levels of IT knowledge.  These results shed light
on the highly disputed role of IT knowledge in the domain of IT investments.
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 “The more tech knowledge we have, the better we can predict ventures’ outcomes.” 
A reputed venture capitalist in the IT domain
Introduction1
The venture capital industry has been raising $20–30 billion
dollars yearly for the past decade.  IT-based startups form the
largest portion of investments backed by venture capitalists
(VCs), accounting for more than one-third of the investments
of the total venture capital industry.  Many successful infor-
mation technology (IT) companies such as Microsoft, Apple,
Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Uber started as VC-funded
startups.  Accolades are often heaped onto the venture capital
industry for creating great IT ventures.  However, the trade
press routinely debates whether VCs are justified to be as
optimistic as they are in evaluating IT startups (Austin 2010;
1William Kettinger was the accepting senior editor for this paper.  Bin Gu
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Economist 2011).  The academic literature further brings
empirical evidence of VCs’ significant overconfidence.  For
instance, Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) found that the vast
majority of VCs in their study exhibited overconfidence in
judging venture success.
Overconfidence, one of the biggest villains of decision
making (Heath and Heath, 2014), has long been shown to lead
to poor financial decisions by investors and managers alike
(Barber and Odean 2000; Benos 1998; Cheng 2007; Daniel et
al. 1998; Odean 1998).  Overconfidence in investors leads
them to trade more frequently (Barber and Odean 2000;
Cheng 2007; Glaser and Weber 2007; Graham et al. 2009;
Odean 1998, 1999), bear greater levels of risk (Odean 1998),
disregard information more (Cooper et al. 1995; Harvey 1994;
Mahajan 1992), fail to prepare for possible adversity, and
consequently loose more money than their peers (Cheng
2007; Odean 1998, 1999).  When managers are overconfident
they use less external finance (Malmendier et al. 2011), over-
spend in corporate investments (Malmendier and Tate 2005),
initiate value destroying acquisitions (Billett and Qian 2008),
and delay needed strategic change in response to poor firm
performance (Park et al. 2011).  The worst part of over-
confidence is that it robs investors of the realization that they
may be mistaken and tricks them into making more of such
financial mistakes (Belsky and Gilovich 2010).  Further, over-
confidence is more likely in environments that are highly
uncertain, stressful, and characterized by time pressure and
information overload, which is exactly the type of environ-
ment faced by VCs (Bygrave 1988; Kunze 1990).  Extant
studies suggest that this type of environment fosters decision
errors, including the overconfidence bias (Baron 1998;
Busenitz and Barney 1997).
There has been significant scholarly interest in understanding
the investment decisions of venture capitalists with an
increased scrutiny of possible decision biases (Dimov 2007;
Franke et al. 2006; Petty and Gruber 2011; Rosenbusch et al.
2013).  Specifically, overconfidence has been shown to
negatively affect VCs’ decision accuracy (Ács and Audretsch
2006; Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001).  VCs typically reject
a large number of funding proposals, many times after a brief
consideration of only a few minutes (Cumming 2012).  There-
fore, overconfidence in decisions keeps VCs from realizing
that they can benefit from more due diligence before refusing
a venture.  On the contrary, if a venture passes an initial
screening, it has a good chance of getting funded as VCs’
overconfidence in their decisions may lead them to not
thoroughly question ventures (Yazdipour 2010).  Overconfi-
dence tricks VCs to limit their information search and keeps
them from identifying concerns that portray a less-enthusiastic
outlook of their investment decisions (Zacharakis 1997).  In
addition, just as in other domains, research suggests that VCs’
overconfidence inhibits their learning and prevents them from
improving their decision processes (Ács and Audretsch 2006;
Cumming 2012).  VCs’ misplaced confidence ultimately hurts
everyone in the system—VCs lose reputation, limited partners
lose money, and the society fails to grow jobs.  Hence,
reasons that lead to VC overconfidence in investment deci-
sions merit further research attention.
Many studies suggest that an increase in knowledge decreases
overconfidence and makes individuals better at recognizing
the limits of their knowledge (Dunning 2011; Ehrlinger et al.
2008).  Experts are better able to foresee uncertainties around
their decisions because of their fine-grained domain knowl-
edge (Gladwell 2007; Sternberg and Grigorenko 2003). 
Theories of expert knowledge suggest that VCs with greater
technical knowledge should better assess their technology
investment decisions (Castanias and Helfat 2001; Eisenhardt
and Schoonhoven 1990; Kor 2003; Shepherd et al. 2003). 
Past research seems to have taken VCs’ technical expertise
for granted and has assumed that VCs are fully capable of
understanding technical aspects of ventures when making
investment decisions in IT startups. If all VCs are equally able
to comprehend the technical aspects of technology ventures,
then the lack of research should not be concerning.  However,
anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise.  For example, two
noteworthy VCs, Bart Stuck and Michael Weingarten (2004),
have expressed their concern about the lack of IT knowledge
among VCs:  “Many [VC funds] are populated with MBA
types who understand business but don’t really understand
technology at an in-depth level.”  Apparently, VCs vary in
their technical expertise and their ability to see technical
uncertainties associated with their technology investment
decisions.
Past work has assumed the relationship between knowledge
and overconfidence to be linear and has reported conflicting
results (Koehler et al. 2002; Skala 2008).  Many studies com-
pare expert stock market investors with nonexperts, and
suggest that overconfidence increases with knowledge
(Bradley 1981; Olsen 1997).  Highly knowledgeable investors
in stock markets are known to overestimate their abilities,
leading to overconfidence in their investment decisions
(Glaser and Weber 2010; Montier 2010).  Perhaps these
studies have compared moderately knowledgeable with highly
knowledgeable on a knowledge continuum, while studies that
have predicted overconfidence to decrease with knowledge
(Dunning 2011; Ehrlinger et al. 2008) have compared less
knowledgeable with moderately knowledgeable on a knowl-
edge continuum.
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In this research, we explain these contradictory results
reported in the literature and suggest that VCs’ technical
knowledge has a U-shaped relationship with overconfidence
in their technology investments.  A few extant consumer
behavior studies corroborate this “happy medium” view.  As
Bettman and Park (1980) and Crotts (1999) find, the moder-
ately knowledgeable do more processing of the currently
available information for making a product choice than do
those with a low or a high knowledge base.  Whereas those
with low knowledge may not have the ability necessary to
process information, the highly knowledgeable may not have
the motivation to do so because they feel they have enough
prior knowledge on which to rely.  A similar complacency in
learning new product information is found by Wood and
Lynch (2002) for those with high prior knowledge.  To the
best of our knowledge, there is scarcity of work that examines
possible nonlinear effects of knowledge on overconfidence in
decision making broadly speaking, and within the field of IT
investments specifically.
Further, VCs’ IT knowledge may moderate the effects of
other aspects of the decision making environment, such as
past successes, failures, and stakes.  We use the framework of
the illusion of knowledge (Dunning 2011; Kruger and Dun-
ning 1999; Miller and Ross 1975) to provide theoretical
arguments for nonlinear and interaction effects of IT knowl-
edge on VC overconfidence.  Our findings provide a more
nuanced picture of the role of IT knowledge and shed light on
the disputed role of IT knowledge for VCs in the IT domain
(Smaltz et al. 2006; Tucci 2007).
With millions of dollars at stake, VCs have strong incentives
to avoid any systematic judgment biases.  Therefore, our
research hypotheses are subjected to strict falsifiability.  As
Massey and Thaler (2013, p. 1479) note,
A question of increasing interest to researchers in a
variety of fields is whether the biases found in
judgment and decision making research remain
present in contexts in which experienced participants
face strong economic incentives.
One of the strengths of this study is the richness of the fine-
grained data gathered from VCs.  The data section describes
this in more detail.  The venture-funding context investigated
in this work is of significant importance.  Eleven percent of
private sector jobs come from venture backed companies, and
venture backed revenue accounts for 21 percent of U.S. GDP
(NVCA 2011b).  VC domain is a big industry (NVCA 2011a),
and is roughly equal to the combined size of three widely
researched industry domains:  online books (BookStats 2011),
box-office (MPAA 2011), and music (Friedlander 2011).
Theory and Hypothesis Development
The Role of IT Knowledge
From Confucius to Socrates to modern times, the secret of a
truly wise decision maker has been understood as knowing
both what one knows and what one does not know (Russo and
Schoemaker 1992).  Management research, however, docu-
ments a pervasive tendency of individuals to fail in under-
standing the limits of their knowledge in a variety of business
domains (Griffin and Varey 1996).  In this work, we refer to
such overassessment of one’s knowledge as the illusion of
knowledge.  For example, CEOs who show a greater tendency
to overestimate their managerial ability tend to be overly
confident in initiating mergers that destroy shareholder value
(Malmendier and Tate 2008).  The effect is particularly pro-
nounced in firms with abundant internal resources because
CEOs can act easily on their inflated perceptions of ability. 
In experimental markets, an overly optimistic assessment of
one’s skill leads to overconfidence in assessing the benefits of
market entry, and more so when an individual self-selects into
games in which the payoff will depend on skill level rather
than chance (Camerer and Lovallo 1999).   Because in mascu-
line domains such as financial investments,  men are known
to show a greater illusion of knowledge than women (Lunde-
berg et al. 2000), this gender difference in self-assessment has
been shown to produce a difference in how overconfident
investors appear to be in their common stock investments 
(Barber and Odean 2001).  To sum up, a variety of research
studies show that the greater the illusion of knowledge, the
more the overconfidence in one’s decisions  (Bjork 1999).
In the context of IT investments, VC confidence in new
business ventures relates to whether they believe their IT
knowledge is high, as is evidenced in the opening quote of
this paper by a reputed venture capitalist:  “The more tech
knowledge we have, the better we can predict ventures’
outcomes.”  Yet, as the above discussion suggests, the danger
lies in a potential overestimation of one’s IT knowledge as
VCs who overestimate their IT knowledge to a greater extent
may be unrealistically optimistic about the success of their
investments (Russo and Schoemaker 1992).  For example,
VCs who are mistaken about their technical knowledge may
overassess their ability to evaluate the founding team and to
recruit strong technical talent (Gorman and Sahlman 1989). 
They may be less inclined to bring in technical consultants
when needed and be less likely to compromise during negotia-
tions with technical vendors because the illusion of knowl-
edge has also been shown to affect how individuals seek
information and how they conduct business negotiations
(Bazerman and Neale 1982; Russo and Schoemaker 1992;
Yaniv 2004).  They may get carried away with technical ver-
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biage and fail to discern the value of the underlying tech-
nology over competing technologies.  They may set wrong
expectations about future product releases and underestimate
time to implement new features.  The fairly straightforward
implication with the illusion of knowledge is that the decision
makers act on their rosy perceptions of reality rather than on
reality itself (March 1994).  As a result, VCs with high illu-
sion of IT knowledge are likely to produce overconfident
valuations of the firms they fund.
On the one hand, less knowledgeable decision makers are
known to succumb more to the illusion of knowledge in
comparison to those who are moderately knowledgeable
(Alter et al. 2010).  For example, in a study of medical doc-
tors, poor performers were found to grossly overestimate their
knowledge and problem solving ability and produce self-
ratings that resembled those of good performers (Haun et al.
2000).  In studies with undergraduate students, those per-
forming in the bottom 25 percent were found to believe that
they are performing above the 60th percentile (Kruger and
Dunning 1999).  Similarly, VCs with low IT knowledge
should more likely overestimate their IT knowledge compared
to VCs with moderate IT knowledge.  They may not know
enough to recognize the limits of what they know and their
view of the IT domain may be overly abstract, producing a
mere illusion of understanding  (Alter et al. 2010).
On the other hand, highly knowledgeable decision makers are
also known to be a more likely target of positive illusions due
to their use of automated intuitive reasoning processes as
opposed to the more deliberative information processing
characteristic of those with moderate levels of IT knowledge
(Shiffrin and Schneider 1977; Slovic et al. 1985).  Once
thinking becomes more automated and intuitive, information
processing happens quickly leaving little time for critical
analysis of decisions taken.  Intuitive reasoning is accom-
panied by a perception of little apparent effort (Hogarth
1987).  The knowledge is not evaluated critically unless
efforts are made for the specific purpose of questioning its
limits.  Familiarity of domain also incites automated rea-
soning processes and a higher illusion of knowledge (Koriat
et al. 1980).  The resulting ease with which judgments are
produced in the familiar IT domain for VCs with high IT
knowledge is likely to lead to the illusion of knowledge
because VCs who are highly knowledgeable in technology are
likely to find the technical evaluation exercise more familiar
than VCs who are moderately knowledgeable in IT.  They are
less likely to engage in self-insight questioning and rely more
on automative reasoning process.  Therefore, more knowl-
edgeable VCs should show a higher illusion of knowledge
than those with moderate IT knowledge.  There is some
research examining the behavior of stock market investors
that lends support to this conjecture.  For example, highly
knowledgeable investors in stock markets are known to over-
estimate their abilities, leading to overconfidence in their
investment decisions (Glaser and Weber 2010; Montier 2010). 
Thus, we argue that both VCs with low and high levels of IT
knowledge will more likely succumb to the illusion of knowl-
edge than VCs with moderate levels of IT knowledge.  The
relationship between IT knowledge and the illusion of IT
knowledge is U-shaped.  We also argued earlier that the illu-
sion of IT knowledge should produce overconfidence.  There-
fore, the relationship between IT knowledge and overconfi-
dence should be U-shaped as well.  VCs with both low and
high levels of IT knowledge will be more likely to overesti-
mate their ability to overcome the adversities of the business
environment of an IT start-up due to their overly positive and
unrealistic view of how much they know about the IT domain. 
As a result, they will produce excessively optimistic assess-
ments of the future of firms they chose to fund.
Hypothesis 1:  IT knowledge has a U-shaped rela-
tionship with VC overconfidence in their IT
investments.
The Role of Past Successes and Failures
The old aphorism “a rising tide lifts all boats” does not seem
to have wide acceptance among investors.  Investors are often
quick to attribute market-wide gains to their knowledge and
ability, and are more likely to invest with much greater confi-
dence after a successful spell (Gervais and Odean 2001). 
Indeed, Billett and Qian (2008) bring evidence of CEO over-
confidence in acquisitions stemming from past successes and
the operation of the self-attribution bias.  Professional fore-
casters also seem to become more overconfident following a
successful forecast.  They begin to erroneously rely to a
greater extent on their private knowledge rather than alter-
native sources of information, to the detriment of forecast
quality (Deaves et al. 2010; Hilary and Hsu 2011; Hilary and
Menzly 2006).  In a similar vein, past successful investments
are likely to induce overconfidence in VCs.  Gino and Pisano
(2011) suggest that past success is an important contributing
factor largely due to the classical self-serving attribution bias
(Miller and Ross 1975).  The self-serving attribution bias
refers to the tendency of decision makers to more readily take
credit for past success than for past failure (Mezulis et al.
2004).  The bias is also known to be particularly strong when
outcomes are ego-involving or important (Miller 1976).  As
a result, decision makers may not feel the need to engage in
careful scanning of their environments to identify alternative
explanations for success. 
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On the contrary, past failures offer an opportunity to reckon
our illusions about self.  Failed funded IT startups should
motivate VCs to reflect on their funding decisions, providing
an opportunity for self-insight; thus, failed investments should
decrease VCs’ overconfidence.  Gervais and Odean (2001)
lend support to the idea that past failures decrease over-
confidence.  In particular, they theorize that, after facing a
failure, investors may question their ability and trade less.  To
sum up, past successes should increase overconfidence in
VCs while past failures should decrease it.
Heath and Tversky (1991), however, point to an important
peculiarity in attributions.  They suggest that attributing past
successes to one’s own knowledge while ascribing past
failures to external factors is more likely for those who
consider themselves to be highly knowledgeable.  Those who
question the limits of their knowledge may not as readily
attribute past successes to their knowledge and failures to
reasons beyond their control.  Individuals in general are
motivated to interpret results in a flattering way as it fosters
a positive view about self and mental well-being (Taylor and
Brown 1988).  They may engage in self-protective attributions
under conditions of past failure (Miller and Ross 1975).  They
may not completely shoulder the blame of failure on self. 
Thus, misperceptions about one’s own knowledge makes it
easier to attribute positive results to one’s own abilities and
negative outcomes to external causes.  If individuals are
unaware of how misplaced their self-assessments are, they
may not have the motivation to diagnose the discrepancy in
attributions (Duval and Silvia 2002).  Individuals with a
higher illusion of knowledge thus should have less of a moti-
vation to question self-enhancing attributions under success
and exhibit more self-enhancing attributions under failures.
Indeed, overconfidence has been reported to be greater for
investors with greater misperceptions about their knowledge
(Glaser and Weber 2010; Montier 2010).  The study by
Knauff et al. (2010) of stock brokers also lends support to this
view.  They found that those who believe themselves to be
highly knowledgeable showed persistence in following their
knowledge beliefs even at the cost of making irrational
choices.  If VCs have illusions about their IT knowledge, they
should be highly motivated to protect that illusion.  The
higher the illusion and the bigger the opportunity posed by a
past success, the more the motivation to welcome this success
by attributing success to one’s own ability.  On the other
hand, the higher the illusion and the bigger the threat posed by
a past failure, the more the motivation to fend off this threat
by ascribing failure to reasons beyond one’s control.  There-
fore, the greater illusion of IT knowledge should strengthen
(weaken) the biasing (de-biasing) effect of past successes
(failures) on VCs’ overconfidence in their funded ventures.
We earlier argued that the relationship between IT knowledge
and the illusion of IT knowledge is U-shaped.  Thus, we pre-
dict that IT knowledge should moderate the effect of success
and failure on overconfidence in the following way:  Because
VCs with low levels of IT knowledge and high levels of IT
knowledge may both succumb to the illusion of IT knowledge
to a greater extent, they are also less likely to resist the
biasing effects of past successes compared to VCs with
moderate levels of IT knowledge.  There should be a stronger
positive relationship between past successes and overcon-
fidence for VCs with low and high levels of IT knowledge
compared to VCs with moderate levels of IT knowledge.  In
other words, when the level of IT knowledge increases from
low to moderate, we expect the biasing effect of past suc-
cesses to diminish.  Yet, as the level of knowledge increases
from moderate to high, the biasing effect of past successes
may increase.  On the other hand, failures may exert a weaker
de-biasing effect on VCs who have low and high IT knowl-
edge, but a stronger effect on those who have moderate levels
of IT knowledge.  When the level of IT knowledge increases
from low to moderate, we expect the de-biasing effect of past
failures to strengthen.  Yet, as the level of knowledge in-
creases from moderate to high, the de-biasing effect of past
failures may become weaker.
Hypothesis 2:  The positive (negative) effect of past
successes (failures) on overconfidence in IT invest-
ments first decreases (increases) and then increases
(decreases) with an increase in IT knowledge.
The Role of Stakes
Another important feature of the decision-making environ-
ment has to do with the stakes associated with accurate judg-
ment (Hogarth 2001).   VCs may be motivated to a different
extent to assess ventures accurately depending on the amount
of funding required.  Indeed, individuals should engage in
greater information gathering and information processing
efforts when more is at stake in a given decision (Hammond
et al. 1999).  Thus, greater stakes are more likely associated
with more systematic and deliberative thinking targeted at
producing more accurate judgments (Chaiken 1980; Chaiken
and Maheswaran 1994).
At the same time, Vroom (1964) suggests that decision
maker’s knowledge level is an important moderator of the
effects of stakes.  The greater motivation by itself may not be
enough to produce accurate judgments.  This is particularly
true in the context of IT investments.  An individual has to
possess the technical knowledge necessary to produce
accurate judgments.  Thus, we expect that it is more likely
that the increased motivation due to higher stakes would
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enable a more accurate judgment on the part of VCs who have
greater levels of IT knowledge.  Note that VCs with low
levels of IT knowledge, despite their high motivation, would
be simply less capable of understanding technology concerns
that may inhibit projected growth.  Hence, they are likely to
show unwarranted optimism.   Because the effect of stakes is
moderated by the actual availability of knowledge rather than
the individual’s subjective assessment of their knowledge, we
do not expect any nonlinearity in the shape of the relationship
between stakes and overconfidence at different levels of VCs’
IT knowledge.  Thus,
H3:  The effect of stakes on overconfidence in IT
investment increases with an increase in IT
knowledge.
Data
To test our hypotheses we require data on VCs’ IT
knowledge, successes, failures, and stakes in investment,
along with over-valuation of IT investments and a host of
control variables.  Since such data was not publicly available,
we approached VCs directly to collect the data for our study. 
Accordingly, our data constitutes a unique and proprietary
data set allowing us to examine the influence of IT knowledge
on VC overconfidence.
We sent data requests in January 2009 to a random sample of
200 VCs who invest in early-stage IT ventures from the
VentureXpert database.  Of these 200 VCs, 47 chose to parti-
cipate in our study (a participation rate of 23.5%).  As part of
their participation, VCs completed an instrument to evaluate
their IT knowledge.  VCs were requested to take the quiz
themselves and it was suggested they not discuss the ques-
tions with anyone.  Since VCs always had the option to not
participate in the survey and are honorable professionals,
there is no apparent reason to doubt their integrity in taking
the quiz.  All of the participating VCs were partners at their
respective firms, and they were not principals or associates. 
Further, the level of analysis in this work is at an individual
VC level and not at the firm level.  No two VCs worked for
the same firm.  Further, it is important to note that data for a
VC is at the individual venture funding level and a VC’s
funding decisions have not been aggregated.  Aggregating
data on investment decisions or on portfolio performance
could hide important nuances in data and invalidate valuable
information.  Out of 47 VCs, 33 provided detailed information
about ventures that sought series A funding from them in
2008.  VCs reported this detailed information about ventures
to us over the first quarter of 2009.  VCs also reported their
expected future series B valuations for these ventures.
Expected valuation in the next round is an important judgment
call that VCs need to make while investing.  Overvaluations
erode their governance control and profitability.  Hence, VCs
have a strong incentive to avoid such overconfidence.  Such
overconfidence likely shows up because VCs genuinely
believe that their assessments are correct.  This makes over-
valuations an excellent measure for overconfidence.  For
calculating overvaluation, we also needed an objective
measure of series B.  We collected the actual valuation data
for series B funding, which did not happen until 2010.  Series
B valuations are largely based on numbers such as market
size, patents, revenue growth, the number of users, customer
traction, and customer acquisition costs.  Ventures by series
B have proven their product–market fit and are now looking
to scale their proven business model.  Ventures need to
expand their marketing efforts and need to grow quickly at
this stage.  At this point, there is a better sense about the
return on various marketing efforts and projection numbers
are more reliable in general.  Consequently, there does not
seem to be an apparent reason to believe that series B
valuations are systematically inflated.  Moreover, the VCs
who funded series B were different from the VCs who
provided us data in 2009 and did not know the expected series
B valuations reported earlier.
We statistically compared 33 VCs who were part of our
sample with those who dropped out using unpaired two-
sample t-tests on the dimensions of VC age and fund size, two
of the variables available to us for all VCs in the original
sample.  Our tests failed to reject the null hypothesis that both
groups have similar average age (p-value = 0.39, t-stat = 0.87)
and similar average fund size (p-value = 0.77, t-stat = -0.29). 
We find no evidence to suggest that the VCs who chose to
participate are systematically different from the VCs who
chose not to participate in any observable way that may
threaten the validity of our findings.  The 33 VCs offered 215
venture term sheets.  The average fund size of the VCs was




Following best practices in the organizational literature on
measurement of knowledge (Ehrlinger et al. 2008; Kruger and
Dunning 1999), we used an objective quiz to evaluate the IT
knowledge of VCs.  This quiz was created through in-depth
interviews with the chief technology officers (CTOs) of 11 IT
and software companies.  These CTOs used the quiz as one of
their hiring exams for a total of 57 software professionals in
a pretest.  Based on the testing, the quiz was improved to
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make it clearer and more robust.  The CTOs agreed that the
quiz provides a reliable measure of an individual’s IT knowl-
edge.  Accordingly, the number of correct answers on the quiz
provides a numerical indicator of the IT knowledge of the
person taking the quiz.2
To validate the quiz for the present research, we partnered
with an IT venture that was actively recruiting recent IT
graduates from universities.  This venture was growing
quickly and finding it difficult to allocate resources to hiring. 
They agreed to use the quiz for testing candidates on their IT
knowledge and provided the GPA of all applicants who took
the quiz.  A total of 98 graduating job candidates took the
quiz.  For these 98 job candidates, we found a positive and
significant correlation between GPA and quiz score (ρ =
0.81and p-value < 0.000).  Of the 98 candidates, 63 did not
have any prior work experience, while the rest had 1 to 3
years of prior work experience.  The correlation for these 63
candidates was ρ = 0.86 and p-value < 0.000, and the corre-
lation for the remaining 35 candidates was ρ = 0.78 and
p-value < 0.000.  These high and statistically significant
correlations between GPA and quiz score provide a strong
independent test of the validity of the quiz for assessing IT
knowledge.
To test the consistency of the measurement of IT knowledge
using quiz scores, we used the split-half method (Bollen
1989).  In this method, a quiz is first divided into two parts,
and the correlation between the quiz score of the two halves
is calculated.  The Spearman–Brown Prophecy formula is
then applied to the correlation to calculate the reliability of the





between the quiz scores of the two halves.  We divided the
quiz into two parts based on odd and even question numbers. 
The split-half reliability for our quiz is 0.887, which is sub-
stantially higher than the threshold value of 0.7 (Bollen 1989)
and indicates that the quiz is reliable. 
Overconfidence
Overconfidence was conceptualized as




where ExpValij is the expected series B funding valuation of
VC i for venture j and ActValj is the actual series B funding
valuation for venture j.
VC Failures
VC failures were defined as the number of VC-funded ven-
tures that defaulted.  We considered a company as defaulted
if it had filed for bankruptcy or had ceased its operations. 
This data was provided to us by VCs.  
VC Successes
VC successes were measured as the number of successful
exits by VCs from ventures which they funded (Shane and
Stuart 2002; Tyebjee and Bruno 1984).  VCs provided us their
past success data.
Stakes
Stakes were operationalized as the amount of funding that a
venture requested from the VC.  This data was provided by
the VCs.
Control Variables
Prior research suggests at least four different categories of
factors that are likely to affect VCs’ overconfidence in their
funding decisions:  aspects of the venture’s environment,
characteristics of the venture, characteristics of the VC, and
characteristics of the VC–venture dyad (Baum and Silverman
2004; Gompers et al. 2010; Zacharakis and Meyer 1998).
Environment Controls
VCs’ overconfidence may differ by industry category.   All
firms in our sample come from the Software and Services
category of the Venture Economics Primary Industry Minor
Group classification of industries.  This category has two sub-
categories:  Software and IT Services.   To control for differ-
ent industry subcategories we coded a dummy variable with
a value of 1 if the firm was in the software subcategory and a
value of 0 if the firm was in the IT Services subcategory.  Our
data do not allow finer grained measures of industry, but all
companies fall strictly into one or the other subgroup.   None
of these firms include hardware or equipment related
categories.
2While we cannot share the actual instrument in publication due to its pro-
prietary nature, the instrument was made accessible to the editors and
reviewers during the peer review process.
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The amount of competition for VCs when choosing to invest
in a venture may also influence VCs’ overconfidence.  The
level of competition may raise the bar on the VCs’ expecta-
tions for venture performance.  To control for potential com-
petition that VCs faced, we used the number of VCs that were
interested in a venture.  The VCs provided the number of VCs
interested in each venture.
Venture Characteristics
The first set of venture characteristics focuses on the charac-
teristics of the founders.  Founders’ reputation was opera-
tionalized by the average number of successful exits (IPOs
and acquisitions) led by the founders of a venture.  Founders’
industry experience was measured by the average of founders’
industry experience in years.  Founding team project manage-
ment experience was the average years of experience of
managing projects for the founding team.  Venture team size
was measured as the total number of team members on the
venture team.
The second set of venture characteristics focuses on the
financial situation of the venture.  Projected revenue was
operationalized as a venture’s assessment of its revenue in
three years.  Venture market size was measured as the 2008
U.S. market value of the business in dollars.
Additional venture characteristics included venture age and
number of patents.  Venture age was measured as the differ-
ence in months between the date when the venture was
incorporated and the date when the funding request was made. 
Number of patents was measured by the count of patents a
venture had applied for at the United States Patent Office. 
Venture characteristics data was largely provided to us by
VCs.  In a few cases when certain information was missing,
we were able to complete the missing information using
VentureXpert and LinkedIn.
VC Characteristics
VCs’ IT experience was calculated as the number of years of
experience the VCs had in the IT industry.  The VCs’ overall
experience was operationalized as the total number of years
of experience as a VC.  The VCs’ fund size was operation-
alized as the total funds they raised.  To control for VCs’ idio-
syncratic characteristics, we gathered feedback from founders
of ventures that received term sheets from the VCs.  Founders
reported their assessments of VCs’ quality on a scale of 1 to
10, where 10 refers to the highest level and 1 refers to the
lowest level.  For each VC, we took the average of founders’
quality score to calculate VC quality.
VC–Venture Dyad Characteristics
VCs receive a lot of funding requests and they prioritize
evaluating deals that come through trusted sources (Shane and
Stuart 2002; Tyebjee and Bruno 1984).  VCs’ trusted sources
typically are entrepreneurs with whom they have worked in
the past, shared alumni, and other similar associations.  Since
trusted sources may also affect VCs’ overconfidence, we con-
trolled for the extent to which the venture comes to the VC
through a trusted referral.  Trusted referral was measured if
the venture was recommended to the VC from one of its
trusted affiliates and VCs shared this data with us.  This was
coded using a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the venture
came through a trusted referral and 0 otherwise.  We also
controlled for VCs’ assessment of ventures’ communication
skills and management capability.  Venture communication
skills was measured as the VCs’ assessment of the venture’s
communication skills on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 10 with
higher scores representing better communication skills.  Ven-
ture management capability was similarly measured as the
VCs’ assessment of the managerial capabilities of the
founding team on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 10 with higher
scores representing better management skills.  We also con-
trolled for the distance between a VC and a venture.  We
calculated distance by identifying longitude and latitude of the
main office for each VC and venture, and then calculated
distance in miles using the Haversine formula, which takes
into account the curvature of the Earth.  Descriptive statistics
and correlation matrix for all variables are provided in Table 1
and Table 2 respectively.
Empirical Analysis
Model Specification
The general specification of our model is as follows:
OverConfij  = β0 + β1knowi + β2(knowi)² + γ1succi +
γ2succi × knowi + γ3succi × (knowi)² + δ1faili + δ2faili
× knowi + δ3faili ×(knowi)² + α1stakesj + α2stakesj ×
knowi + α3 stakesj × (knowi)² + Xiπ + Yjθ + Zijψ+ μi +
gij
where OverConfij is the overconfidence of VC i for venture j, 
knowi is the IT knowledge of VC i, succi is the number of
successes for VC  i, faili is the number of failures for VC i,
stakesj is the amount requested by venture j, Xi is the vector of
VC level control variables, Yj is a vector of venture level
control variables, Zij is a vector of the VC–venture dyad level
control variables, μi is VC-level unobserved effects, and gij is
idiosyncratic error. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
 Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max
Overconfidence (%) 48.4 41.84 -50 150
VC IT knowledge (out of 40) 19.18 5.35 10 28
VC successes 2.62 1.68 1 6
VC failures 7.97 3.68 1 15
Stakes ($Mil) 4.92 1.48 1.5 7.5
VC quality 7.40 1.71 2 10
Team size 3.11 1.16 1 6
Founder reputation 2.40 0.90 0 4
Project management experience 4.09 1.69 0 8
Venture age (months) 13.41 1.60 9 18
Founder experience (years) 9.19 2.64 1 16
Number of patents 1.63 2.47 0 10
Projected revenue ($Mil) 5.52 1.16 2.4 8.4
Dummy soft 0.36 0.48 0 1
Competition 1.53 1.73 0 6
Market size ($Billion) 6.77 4.02 0.16 17
Dummy reference 0.49 0.50 0 1
Communication 6.46 2.75 1 10
Management capability 4.44 1.82 1 10
Distance (miles) 401.30 295.89 25 1753
VC age (Years) 45.90 4.38 38 53
Fund size ($ Million) 127.79 68.37 36 245
Years of experience 8.12 2.94 5 16
VC IT experience 16.82 4.19 10 25
To control for VC-specific unobserved effects, we estimated
the model using both a fixed effects model and a random
effects model.  If unobserved effects are uncorrelated with
other independent variables, then a random effect model is
preferred over a fixed effects model (Greene 2003).  We
performed a Hausman test (Greene 2003).  The Hausman test
was insignificant (χ²; p = 0.42), implying that the VC-level
unobserved effects are not correlated with other independent
variables.  Hence, we use a random effects model to control
for VC specific unobserved effects.
Since we have square terms and interaction terms in our
model, multicollinearity can be a potential issue.  Initial data
exploration showed that IT knowledge was highly correlated
with its square term.  Also, the interactions were highly corre-
lated with the component parts used to define them.   The high
correlations raises the issue of multicollinearity which, if
uncorrected, may lead to inflated standard errors and, in the
worst case, inconsistent or unstable estimates (Greene 2003). 
We used the standard method of mean centering variables
before taking their square or forming interaction terms to
reduce the correlations to an acceptable level (Gelman and
Hill 2007; Jaccard and Turrisi 2003).  As a diagnostic check
for multicollinearity, we calculated the variance inflation
factors (VIF) for each variable (Greene 2003); the maximum
value of VIF across all models is 5.26, which is below the
generally accepted threshold of 10 (Belsley et al. 2004).
Results
The detailed results of our analysis are presented in Table 3.
Model 1 contains control variables only.  Model 2 reports the
results when we add focal independent variables to the
analysis.  Wald test indicates that coefficients of focal inde-
pendent variables are not simultaneously equal to zero (χ², p <
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Table 2.  Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Overconfidence 1            
2 VC IT knowledge 0.10 1           
3 VC successes 0.13 0.13 1          
4 VC failures -0.55 -0.33 0.35 1         
5 Stakes -0.34 -0.10 -0.18 0.04 1        
6 VC quality -0.20 0.02 -0.33 -0.15 0.14 1       
7 Team size 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.02 -0.14 0.07 1      




0.13 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.09 1    
10 Venture age 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.11 0.05 -0.01 0.11 0.07 1   
11 Founder experience 0.08 0.05 -0.09 -0.02 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.23 0.19 0.14 1  
12 Number of patents 0.21 0.10 0.05 -0.03 -0.22 0.01 0.09 -0.14 0.16 -0.09 -0.06 1
13 Projected revenue -0.03 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.17 0.14 -0.05
14 Dummy soft 0.09 0.18 -0.03 -0.14 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.01
15 Competition 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.14 -0.02 -0.09 0.04
16 Market size 0.19 -0.02 0.15 0.03 -0.22 -0.10 0.10 -0.17 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.15
17 Dummy reference 0.04 0.05 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.10 -0.12 0.07 0.05




0.22 -0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.09 -0.22 -0.02 -0.15 0.00 0.07 -0.02 0.11
20 Distance -0.10 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.01 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.07 0.08 -0.21
21 VC age 0.24 -0.02 0.18 -0.24 -0.11 0.12 0.08 -0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.07
22 Fund size -0.33 0.40 -0.33 -0.07 0.25 0.30 -0.07 0.12 0.15 0.02 0.13 -0.05
23 Years of experience 0.12 -0.17 0.09 0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.13 -0.06 0.07 -0.08
24 VC IT experience -0.12 -0.56 -0.13 0.04 0.15 0.02 -0.07 0.12 0.00 0.09 -0.11 -0.10
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
13 Projected revenue 1            
14 Dummy soft 0.07 1           
15 Competition 0.11 0.00 1          
16 Market size 0.08 -0.06 0.10 1         
17 Dummy reference -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 1        




-0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.10 -0.07 0.06 1      
20 Distance 0.01 -0.09 0.09 -0.16 0.07 0.08 -0.03 1     
21 VC age -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.17 0.01 0.01 0.04 1    




-0.15 -0.02 0.08 -0.15 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.09 -0.25 1  
24 VC IT experience -0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.08 -0.08 -0.06 0.23 -0.24 0.06 1
896 MIS Quarterly Vol. 39 No. 4/December 2015
Singh et al./Effect of IT Knowledge on Overconfidence in IT Investments








Model:  Interactions of
successes with VC IT
knowledge
Model:  Interactions of
failures with VC IT
knowledge
Model:  Interactions of



































Dependent variable:  VCs’ overconfidence
VC IT Knowledge
 -1.9940*** -2.3070*** -1.8875** -2.0001*** -2.0945** -2.0890*** -2.0524*** -2.1415** 
 (0.6965) (0.7731) (0.7403) (0.7115) (0.9829) (0.6553) (0.6624) (0.9225)   
VC successes
 4.8486 5.0281 0.2819 5.2192 5.3496 3.8714 3.5309 0.6424
 (3.2869) (3.3022) (4.7314) (3.3369) (3.4537) (3.2018) (3.1130) (4.8802)   
VC failures
 -7.7879*** -7.8803*** -7.5938*** -7.7880*** -7.7500*** -7.6304*** -7.5272*** -6.9134***
 (0.8752) (0.8737) (1.0002) (0.8506) (0.9766) (0.8803) (0.9150) (1.2844)   
Stakes
 -3.6202*** -3.5489*** -3.3900*** -3.5534*** -3.5426*** -3.8966*** -3.4035*** -3.5745***
 (1.0028) (0.9874) (0.9897) (1.0158) (1.0063) (0.5793) (1.0328) (0.9937)   
(VC IT
Knowledge)²
 0.5948*** 0.6142*** 0.6100*** 0.5482*** 0.5427*** 0.5951*** 0.6011*** 0.5131***
 (0.1598) (0.1533) (0.1287) (0.1774) (0.1898) (0.1473) (0.1431) (0.1638)   
VC IT Knowledge
× VC successes
  0.3048 0.2311     0.0368




   0.1422**     0.1195*  
   (0.0633) (0.0700)
VC IT Knowledge
× VC failures
    -0.168 -0.1845   -0.3249
    (0.2110) (0.2490)   (0.2348)   
(VC IT Knowl-
edge)2  × VC
failures
     -0.0051   -0.0259
     (0.0310) (0.0305)
VC IT Knowledge
× stakes
      -0.5096*** -0.5557*** -0.5003***




       -0.0175 -0.0071
(0.0247) (0.0267)
VC Quality
-2.508 -1.2523 -1.618 -0.5491 -0.773 -0.7525 -1.2893 -1.4273 0.0721
(3.2656) (1.9184) (2.0397) (1.9050) (2.0248) (2.0255) (1.8478) (1.8459) (1.8616)   
Team size
0.9945 1.2059** 1.2018** 1.1768* 1.2022* 1.1908* 1.1891** 1.3139** 1.3416** 
(0.7154) (0.6076) (0.6073) (0.6070) (0.6153) (0.6202) (0.5886) (0.5901) (0.5940)   
Founder reputation
1.9050* 1.8535* 1.8335* 1.8171* 1.8494* 1.8443* 2.0307** 2.1620** 2.1607** 




1.5759** 1.7184*** 1.7491*** 1.6854*** 1.6989*** 1.6949*** 1.5893*** 1.6112*** 1.6568***
(0.7008) (0.5547) (0.5630) (0.5717) (0.5600) (0.5633) (0.5143) (0.5206) (0.5365)
Venture age
0.2522 0.5288 0.5278 0.4819 0.5069 0.5008 0.584 0.6333 0.6105
(0.5437) (0.4644) (0.4683) (0.4730) (0.4603) (0.4610) (0.4193) (0.4400) (0.4481)   
Founder
experience
1.8981*** 2.0773*** 2.0820*** 2.0550*** 2.0852*** 2.0890*** 1.8208*** 1.7341*** 1.7345***
(0.3251) (0.3103) (0.3113) (0.3043) (0.3088) (0.3083) (0.3127) (0.3343) (0.3405)   
Number of patents
0.2363 0.3334 0.3308 0.3353 0.3213 0.3157 0.2762 0.3394 0.3399
(0.4414) (0.3875) (0.3911) (0.3947) (0.3871) (0.3908) (0.4253) (0.4254) (0.4304)   
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Dependent Variable:  VCs’ Overconfidence
Projected revenue
0.1296 0.1059 0.1146 0.1695 0.1197 0.1286 0.2863 0.1933 0.2403
(0.7703) (0.7341) (0.7420) (0.7453) (0.7382) (0.7391) (0.7500) (0.7500) (0.7646)   
Dummy soft
1.8308 1.8165 1.7802 1.6994 1.7771 1.7814 2.0957 2.3736 2.2016
(1.9587) (1.5524) (1.5641) (1.5663) (1.5565) (1.5709) (1.5464) (1.5417) (1.5718)   
Competition
0.9641* 0.8971*** 0.9132*** 0.9227*** 0.9181*** 0.9226*** 0.6920** 0.6194** 0.6916** 
(0.5414) (0.3121) (0.3122) (0.3128) (0.3125) (0.3141) (0.2943) (0.3143) (0.3113)   
Market size
0.9652** 0.4353* 0.4374* 0.4459* 0.4470* 0.4491* 0.4348* 0.4254* 0.4647** 
(0.4161) (0.2318) (0.2321) (0.2385) (0.2359) (0.2378) (0.2249) (0.2215) (0.2307)   
Dummy reference
4.2389*** 3.0985** 3.0752** 2.8693** 3.0298** 3.0152** 3.0439*** 3.5236*** 3.1780***
(1.5693) (1.2729) (1.2957) (1.2977) (1.2800) (1.2902) (1.1473) (1.2593) (1.2265)   
Communication
0.1119 0.471 0.4631 0.4507 0.4658 0.4661 0.4421 0.4471 0.4349
(0.3412) (0.3509) (0.3520) (0.3525) (0.3526) (0.3524) (0.3272) (0.3316) (0.3363)   
Management
capability
0.8173** 0.9765** 0.9862** 0.9907** 0.9549** 0.9469** 0.8909** 1.0199*** 0.9972***
(0.4127) (0.4236) (0.4264) (0.4159) (0.4257) (0.4214) (0.3767) (0.3793) (0.3816)   
Distance
-0.0042 -0.0029 -0.003 -0.0031 -0.003 -0.003 -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.002
(0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)   
VC age
3.0927** 0.6435 0.7085 0.3747 0.435 0.4229 0.6875 0.6761 0.1002
(1.2274) (0.9741) (0.9850) (1.0615) (1.0736) (1.0686) (0.9808) (0.9703) (1.0994)   
Fund size
-0.1708** -0.0465 -0.0304 -0.022 -0.0418 -0.0397 -0.0317 -0.0317 -0.0077
(0.0776) (0.0626) (0.0682) (0.0708) (0.0640) (0.0660) (0.0621) (0.0618) (0.0693)   
VC IT experience
-2.9769 -1.8255 -1.8617 -1.1605 -1.6989 -1.735 -1.8201 -1.7503 -1.1406
(2.4692) (1.9647) (1.9777) (1.0368) (1.9942) (1.0754) (1.9675) (1.9627) (1.0566)   
(VC IT
experience)² 
0.3289 0.1156 0.049 0.1348 0.2033 0.2112 0.0994 0.094 0.3142
(0.3060) (0.2208) (0.2471) (0.1908) (0.2450) (0.2568) (0.2138) (0.2108) (0.2284)   
Years of
experience
1.3117 -1.8937* -2.2114** -1.4483 -1.8234* -1.8358* -2.0303** -2.0560** -1.4535
(1.5634) (1.0620) (1.0377) (1.0008) (1.0952) (1.0841) (0.9874) (0.9382) (0.9368)   
Constant
-124.6986** 43.7967 57.3641 52.3072 -15.6972 -15.8551 26.0264 26.3505 -22.37
(57.9865) (50.1077) (51.3307) (57.6817) (47.0001) (47.2180) (49.1328) (48.3838) (50.6541)   
Adjusted R² 0.3696 0.8089 0.8098 0.8285 0.808 0.8072 0.8283 0.8277 0.8371
N 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215
All the reported models are random effects models.  Model 1 presents results of model with only control variables; model M2 (no-interaction model)
adds focal independent variables in addition to control variables; model M3a adds interaction of  successes with VCs’ IT knowledge to the no-
interaction model; model M3b adds interaction of  successes with square of VCs’ IT knowledge to the model M3a; model M4a adds interaction of 
failures with VCs’ IT knowledge to the no-interaction model; model M4b adds interaction of  failures with square of VCs’ IT knowledge to the model
M4a; model M5a adds interaction of  stakes with VCs’ IT knowledge to the no-interaction model; model M5b adds interaction of  stakes with square
of VCs’ IT knowledge to the model M5a; model M6 is complete model with all interaction terms.
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
898 MIS Quarterly Vol. 39 No. 4/December 2015
Singh et al./Effect of IT Knowledge on Overconfidence in IT Investments
0.01) which suggests that focal independent variables have a
significant influence on overconfidence.  Henceforth, we will
refer to model 2 as the no-interactions model.  The subsequent
models report results where we add interaction terms to the
no-interactions model.  Models M3a, M4a, and M5a add
interactions of VCs’ IT knowledge with successes, failures
and stakes respectively.  Models M3b, M4b, and M5b add
interactions of both VCs’ IT knowledge and square of VCs’
IT knowledge with successes, failures, and stakes, respec-
tively.  Model M6 is the complete model and adds all the
interaction terms simultaneously.
Hypothesis 1 Result:  Effect of IT
Knowledge on Overconfidence
Consistent with hypothesis 1, we find that IT knowledge has
a curvilinear relationship with over-confidence.  The coeffi-
cient of IT knowledge is negative and statistically significant
(-2.1415, p-value < 0.05) whereas the coefficient of square of
IT knowledge is positive and statistically significant (0.5131,
p-value < 0.01).  The positive and significant value of the
square term indicates that the relationship between IT knowl-
edge and overconfidence is not linear.  Figure 1 plots the
predicted value of overconfidence at different values of IT
knowledge keeping all other independent variables at their
mean value.  Figure 1 shows that the predicted value of over-
confidence is highest at minimum value of IT knowledge.  As
IT knowledge increases from its minimum value, overcon-
fidence first decreases and reaches a minimum point when IT
knowledge is moderate.  Overconfidence subsequently in-
creases with increase in VCs’ IT knowledge.  This means that
VCs with high and low IT knowledge will be more over-
confident than VCs with a moderate level of IT knowledge.
Hypothesis 2 Result
Effect of VC successes on overconfidence:  In model 6, succi,
succi × knowi, and succi × know²i together represent the influ-
ence of successes in predicting overconfidence.  The coeffi-
cient of interaction of square of IT knowledge with successes
is positive and statistically significant (0.1195, p-value < 0.1),
which indicates that the marginal effect of successes has a
non-linear relationship with IT knowledge (Aiken and West
1991).  However, the conclusion about the marginal effect for
successes cannot be made from the table alone (Davidson and
MacKinnon 1993).  The mean of marginal effect of successes
is γ1 + γ2knowi + γ3(knowi)² and the standard error of the
marginal effect is G³j,k = 1αj αk COV(γj, γk), where α1 = 1, α2 =
knowi, and α3 = know²i.   As evident from these equations, the
mean and the standard error of marginal effect of successes
depend on value of the VCs’ IT knowledge.
To correctly interpret the statistical significance of the mar-
ginal effect of successes across varying levels of the moder-
ating variable, we plot the mean value of marginal effect of
the successes on overconfidence along with the confidence
intervals at different values of the VCs’ IT knowledge in
Figure 2.  In Figure 2, the confidence intervals intersect the
x-axis for the mid-range of knowledge values which indicates
that the marginal effect of successes is insignificant for
moderate values of VCs’ IT knowledge.  Nevertheless, the
confidence intervals are above zero on both the left side and
the right side of Figure 2, which indicates that the marginal
effect of successes is positively significant at both high and
low values of the VCs’ IT knowledge.  Further, the marginal
effect of success on overconfidence initially decreases with an
increase in VCs’ IT knowledge and reaches a minimum point
when VCs’ IT knowledge is at the same level at which over-
confidence was at its minimum.  Subsequently, the marginal
effect of successes increases with an increase in IT knowl-
edge.  In conclusion, the biasing positive effect of successes
on overconfidence is higher at the extreme ends of the IT
knowledge continuum and the effect decreases and subse-
quently becomes insignificant as we move toward the mid-
range of VCs’ IT knowledge. 
Effect of VC failures on overconfidence:  In model 6, faili.
faili × know²i, and  faili × know²i together represent the influ-
ence of failures in predicting overconfidence.  Both the coeffi-
cient of  interaction of IT knowledge with failures and square
of IT knowledge with failures are insignificant, which
suggests that IT knowledge does not significantly moderate
the influence of failures on overconfidence (Aiken and West
1991).
Although the above result indicates that IT knowledge does
not moderate the influence of failures on overconfidence, it
does not imply that failures have no significant influence on
overconfidence.  To correctly interpret the statistical signifi-
cance of marginal effect of failures across varying levels of
interacting variables, we plot the mean value of marginal
effect of the failures on overconfidence along with the confi-
dence intervals at different values of the VCs’ IT knowledge
in Figure 3.  In Figure 3, the confidence intervals are always
below zero, which indicates that failures have a significant
negative effect on overconfidence for all values of VCs’ IT
knowledge.  In conclusion, failures have a significant negative
effect on overconfidence but the effect does not change signi-
ficantly with the VCs’ IT knowledge.
Successes are consistent with the moderation effect theorized
in hypothesis 2, whereas failures do not show such a modera-
tion effect.  To sum up, hypothesis 2 is supported for suc-
cesses but not for failures.
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Based on Model 2 (Model with square VCs’
IT knowledge and no interaction terms)
Based on Model 6 (Complete model)
Figure 1.  Predicted Value of Overconfidence (%) at Different Values of VCs’ KIT Knowledge
Based on Model 4b (Model with interaction of successes with VCs’
IT knowledge, interaction of successes with square VCs’ IT
knowledge, and no other interaction term)
Based on Model 6 (Complete model)
Solid line represents mean value of the marginal effect and dashed vertical lines represent 90% confidence interval (CI).  The gray
regions represent regions where marginal effect is significant (i.e., where CI intersects x = 0 line).
Figure 2.  Marginal Effect of Successes on Overconfidence at Different Values of VCs’ IT Knowledge
Hypothesis 3 Results:  Effect of
Stakes on Overconfidence
In model 6,  stakej, stakej × knowi and  stakej × know²i together
represent the influence of stakes in predicting overconfidence. 
The coefficient of interaction of square of IT knowledge with
stakes is insignificant.  This result indicates that the marginal
effect of IT knowledge will not have a significant curvilinear
relationship with VCs’ IT knowledge.  However, the conclu-
sion about the marginal effect of stakes cannot be made from
the table alone (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993).  To cor-
rectly interpret whether the marginal effect is statistically
significant across varying levels of VCs’ IT knowledge, we
plot the mean value of marginal effect of the stakes on over-
valuation along with the 90 percent confidence intervals at
different values of VCs’ IT knowledge in Figure 4.  In Figure
4, the confidence intervals intersect the x-axis at low values
of VCs’ IT knowledge, which indicates that the marginal
effect is not statistically different from zero at low values of
the VCs’ IT knowledge.  Nevertheless, the confidence inter-
vals are below zero at higher values of the VCs’ IT knowl-
edge, which indicates that the marginal effect is negatively
significant at the higher values of the VCs’ IT knowledge. 
These results provide support for hypothesis 3.
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Based on Model 5b (Model with interaction of failures with VCs’ IT
knowledge, interaction of failures with square of VCs’ IT
knowledge, and no other interactions)
Based on Model 6 (Complete model)
Solid line represents mean value of the marginal effect and dashed vertical lines represent 90% confidence interval (CI).
Figure 3.  Marginal Effect of Failures on Overconfidence at Different Values of VCs’ IT Knowledge
Based on Model 2b  (Model with interaction of stakes with VCs’ IT
knowledge, interaction of stake with square of VCs’ IT knowledge,
and no other interactions)
Based on Model 6 (Complete model)
Solid line represents mean value of the marginal effect and dashed vertical lines represent 90% confidence interval (CI).  The gray
regions represent regions where marginal effect is insignificant (i.e., where CI intersects x = 0 line).
Figure 4.  Marginal Effect of Stakes on Overconfidence at Different Values of VCs’ IT Knowledge
Effect of Stakes on Overconfidence:
Results Summary 
We find support for hypotheses 1, and 3, but found only
partial support for hypothesis 2.  The results indicate that VCs
with high and low levels of IT knowledge are more likely to
be overconfident than VCs with a moderate level of IT knowl-
edge.  Our results also suggest that IT knowledge initially
reduces the biasing effects of successes on overconfidence;
however, when IT knowledge increases beyond a certain
level, it increases the effect of successes on overconfidence. 
The failures have a negative effect on overconfidence but the
effect does not change with VCs’ IT knowledge.  Also, stakes
have a negative effect on overconfidence and this effect
increases with VCs’ IT knowledge.  
Robustness Checks:  Quiz Reliability
Earlier, we reported the quiz reliability using the split-half
method, which calculated quiz reliability based on the correla-
tion between scores on the even-half and the odd-half of the
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quiz.  As an additional robustness check, we estimated models
using scores on the even-half and the odd-half of the quiz. 
The results using scores on the even-half, the odd-half, and
the complete quiz are quantitatively similar, which cor-
roborates the reliability of the quiz score.   The result of this
analysis is reported in models R1 and R2 in Table 4.
Curvilinear effect of VC experience:  There is a possibility
that general business knowledge may have a nonlinear effect
on overconfidence.  We use experience3 as a proxy for general
business knowledge and control for this potential nonlinear
effect in an additional robustness check.  The results of the
analysis are reported in model R3 in Table 4.  The results are
qualitatively similar even after controlling for curvilinear
effects of VCs’ general experience.
Selection bias:  We have overconfidence data for only ven-
tures that received funding from VCs.  This can lead to
sample selection as VCs may systematically fund certain ven-
tures over others.  We followed the standard method of
Heckman two step models to account for the selection bias
(Heckman1979).  In the first stage of the analysis, a probit
regression was used to estimate the likelihood of a venture
receiving funding using the sample of the ventures that VCs
invited to give presentations.  The results of step 1 are
reported in model R4 in Table 4.  Estimates from step 1 are
then used to obtain a Heckman’s selection correction term.  In
step 2, we inserted the correction term into overconfidence
equation and reestimated the model.  The results remain quali-
tatively similar even after controlling for selection bias and
are reported in model R5 in Table 4.
Alternative measure for overconfidence:  In our analysis, we
used overvaluation as a measure for overconfidence.  A con-
cern with this measure could be that series B valuations could
be biased, especially if the same VCs funded both series A
and series B.  However, this is not a problem in our dataset,
since no VC funded both rounds in our sample.  Any such
potential bias should only add noise to the data and should not
systematically affect the results.  However, as a robustness
check, instead of using overvaluation, we used expected
valuations as a measure of overconfidence, and the results
were qualitatively the same.  The results of this analysis are
reported in model R6 in Table 4.
Robustness check for overfitting:  To allay concerns with
overfitting we repeated the analyses using a simple model
containing only the key explanatory variables and inter-
actions.  These results are shown in model R7 in Table 4.  The
predicted relationships still hold in this simple model, sug-
gesting that overfitting should not be a concern.
Robustness check for VC heterogeneity:  Based on a Hausman
test, we used a random effects model to control for unob-
served heterogeneity across VCs.  As an additional robustness
check, we now report the results of a VC fixed effects model
as well.  The results of the VC fixed effects model are quali-
tatively similar to the results reported earlier and are reported
in model R8 in Table 4.
Conclusion and Discussion
Our research contributes to the literature on how IT knowl-
edge affects overconfidence in decisions, particularly in IT
investments, in several ways.  First, we propose and empiri-
cally test the U-shaped relationship between IT knowledge
and VC overconfidence.  To the best of our knowledge, this
nonlinear relationship has not been explored so far, and it
explains the contradictory findings reported in the broader
decision-making literature regarding the relationship between
knowledge and overconfidence.  Our work cautions
researchers from defining experts as individuals who know
more than others irrespective of their specific place on the
knowledge continuum as there may be nonlinear effects of
expertise.
Second, we point out that IT knowledge may moderate the
effect of past successes and failures on VC overconfidence. 
As far as we know, how knowledge may change the effect of
successes and failures on overconfidence has not been studied
before.  While findings support the moderation effect of IT
knowledge for successes, they do not support the moderation
effect of IT knowledge for failures.  Perhaps future research
should examine why failures reduce overconfidence irrespec-
tive of IT knowledge.
Third, we suggest that IT knowledge strengthens the de-
biasing effect of stakes on overconfidence, and find support
for it in the data.  That is, without IT knowledge, VCs are not
able to respond to higher stakes decisions requiring more
accurate venture assessments.  VCs’ judgments are less over-
confident in the face of higher stakes only when they possess
higher levels of IT knowledge, and that emphasizes the
practical relevance of IT knowledge.
Fourth, we examined real-life funding decisions of VCs in the
IT domain worth millions of dollars and, thus, our research
hypotheses were subjected to strict falsifiability.  Importantly,
we measure overconfidence at a point where it matters
practically:  individual firm valuation judgments.  Firm valua-
3We thank William Kettinger and the anonymous review team for suggesting
we use experience as a proxy for general business knowledge.
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Table 4.  Robustness Check
Quiz reliability
VC








































-2.2485*** -2.3560** -1.5457* -0.0116 -2.1294** -0.1771** -1.1202**  
(0.7894) (0.9286) (0.9032) (0.0233) (0.9399) (0.0843) [0.4814]  
VC successes
2.3888 0.6572 -0.327 0.1014 0.2123 -0.2646 -1.5477  
(4.1713) (5.2502) (3.9006) (0.0769) (4.8977) (0.3129) (4.2196)  
VC failures
-7.0555*** -6.4798*** -6.4221*** -0.0211 -7.0584*** -0.5108*** -8.1024***  
(1.1406) (1.4156) (1.3724) (0.0284) (1.2347) (0.1068) (1.0463)  
Stakes
-3.0678*** -4.3652*** -5.4770*** 0.3729*** -5.4960*** -0.6019* -2.1362** -3.1901***
(0.8681) (1.1284) (1.4882) (0.0732) (2.1122) (0.3154) (0.8472) (0.9495)
(VC IT Knowledge)²
0.4337*** 0.5066*** 0.5418*** 0.0035 0.4909*** 0.0700*** 0.6210***  
(0.1322) (0.1737) (0.1610) (0.0034) (0.1692) (0.0169) (0.1273)  
VC IT Knowledge ×
VC successes
0.0561 0.0564 0.0891 0.0101 -0.0051 0.0147 -0.1035  
(0.2952) (0.3239) (0.2735) (0.0088) (0.2527) (0.0339) (0.2546)
(VC IT Knowledge)² ×
VC successes
0.1279* 0.1396* 0.1372** -0.0024 0.1293* 0.0212*** 0.1439*  
(0.0673) (0.0815) (0.0641) (0.0016) (0.0714) (0.0080) (0.0747)
VC IT Knowledge   ×
VC failures
-0.2606 -0.4833 -0.2913 0.0047 -0.3341 -0.0016 0.0994  
(0.1904) (0.2967) (0.2446) (0.0072) (0.2384) (0.0295) (0.2050)  
(VC IT Knowledge)² ×
VC failures
-0.031 -0.0383 -0.0277 0.0000 -0.0214 0.0002 0.0286  
(0.0275) (0.0397) (0.0333) (0.0010) (0.0299) (0.0032) (0.0324)
VC IT Knowledge ×
stakes
-0.5397*** -0.4590*** -0.3943** -0.0056 -0.4765*** -0.0632** -0.6775*** -0.5079***
(0.1098) (0.1442) (0.1909) (0.0083) (0.1446) (0.0313) (0.1136) (0.1311)
(VC IT Knowledge)² ×
stakes
-0.0179 0.0068 0.0259 -0.0040*** 0.0143 0.0000 -0.0282 -0.0116
(0.0180) (0.0300) (0.0371) (0.0015) (0.0366) (0.0063) (0.0241) (0.0259)
VC Quality
-0.2434 -0.1859 -1.0336 -0.0627 0.3397 -0.3682   
(2.1746) (1.8090) (1.7517) (0.0456) (1.9540) (0.2855)   
Team size
1.5701** 1.4778** 2.8408*** 0.1820*** 0.2624 -0.076  1.0847*
(0.6127) (0.6063) (0.8434) (0.0497) (0.9952) (0.1928)  (0.5913)
Founder reputation
2.2850** 2.3099** 3.1207** -0.0462 2.3094** 0.1232  1.9058**
(0.9836) (0.9325) (1.3259) (0.0717) (0.9321) (0.2597)  (0.8868)
Project management
experience
1.7037*** 1.9290*** 2.9672*** 0.2154*** 0.4708 0.3207**  1.3801**
(0.5202) (0.5562) (0.7009) (0.0405) (1.0247) (0.1505)  (0.5273)
Venture age
0.5402 0.8624* 1.225 0.0298 0.4079 0.0539  0.4359
(0.4642) (0.5040) (0.9013) (0.0376) (0.4580) (0.1201)  (0.4065)
Founder experience
1.5755*** 1.7720*** 1.1447** 0.0334 1.5783*** 0.0457  1.8678***
(0.3683) (0.3537) (0.5541) (0.0234) (0.3288) (0.0792)  (0.3031)
Number of patents
0.4696 0.3757 1.1295** 0.0713** -0.0753 0.0115  0.2468
(0.4309) (0.4428) (0.5744) (0.0301) (0.4894) (0.0758)  (0.4238)
Projected revenue
0.1174 0.1913 -0.123 0.0980* -0.1887 -0.3609*  0.3551
(0.7604) (0.7775) (0.8775) (0.0536) (0.7704) (0.1911)  (0.7484)
Dummy soft
2.5632 2.0627 3.0173 -0.2757** 3.4940* 0.2614  1.9918
(1.6008) (1.5367) (2.1731) (0.1236) (1.9208) (0.4691)  (1.5963)
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Table 4.  Robustness Check (Continued)
Quiz reliability
VC








































0.6291** 0.7118** 0.7251* 0.021 0.6643** 0.0009  0.7733**
(0.3120) (0.3107) (0.4024) (0.0339) (0.3198) (0.1194)  (0.3048)
Market size
0.4395** 0.4997** 0.4045 0.0248 0.3244 0.1016*  0.4103
(0.2200) (0.2291) (0.2546) (0.0171) (0.2638) (0.0522)  (0.2453)
Dummy reference
4.0504*** 2.7853** 4.4687** 0.5776*** -0.1616 0.1273  2.8289**
(1.3010) (1.2278) (1.8227) (0.1240) (3.0056) (0.3792)  (1.2232)
Communication
0.4062 0.4706 0.3663 0.0334 0.2489 -0.0035  0.4254
(0.3310) (0.3553) (0.4010) (0.0217) (0.3810) (0.0725)  (0.3198)
Management
capability
1.1905*** 1.0210*** 1.6720** 0.0709** 0.528 0.2708*  0.8229**
(0.4126) (0.3828) (0.6890) (0.0310) (0.4953) (0.1435)  (0.3802)
Distance
-0.0014 -0.0017 0.002 -0.0011*** 0.004 0.0007  -0.0027
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0002) (0.0056) (0.0006)  (0.0022)
VC age
-0.0015 0.2452 0.0699 0.0093 0.0641 0.091   
(0.9708) (1.2029) (1.0302) (0.0175) (1.1102) (0.1030)   
Fund size
-0.014 -0.0065 -0.0166 0.0001 -0.0091 0.0015   
(0.0685) (0.0643) (0.0628) (0.0013) (0.0703) (0.0071)   
VC IT experience
-0.9961 -1.4608 -0.7034 -0.006 -1.2016 -0.0298   
(1.0646) (1.0305) (0.9344) (0.0196) (1.0733) (0.0966)   
(VC IT experience)²
0.3155 0.3985 0.2697 -0.0103 0.3575 -0.0175   
(0.2135) (0.2502) (0.1985) (0.0156) (0.2413) (0.0281)   
Years of experience
-1.4194 -1.3483 -1.3425 0.0036 -1.5143 -0.5834***   
(1.0112) (0.9068) (1.3212) (0.0274) (0.9649) (0.1272)   
(Years of
experience)²
  0.0383      




    -9.3193    
    (7.5128)    
Constant
-11.6567 -36.1646 -43.6336 -2.9047*** 3.3274 19.4889*** 30.0675*** -2.3337
(46.5404) (51.7457) (43.4991) (0.9543) (55.0396) (3.8679) (5.5641) (8.5189)
Adjusted R²/Log
likelihood
0.8452 0.8549 0.8607 -299.7398 0.8612 0.687 0.7754 0.576
N 215 215 215 689 215 215 215 215
All the reported models except model R8 are random effects models.  Model R8 is a fixed effects model.  All models present results for robustness
checks pertaining to (1) quiz reliability (R1 and R2), (2) VC experience (R3), (3) selection bias (R4 and R5), (4) the measure of overconfidence
(R6), (5) overfitting (R7), and (6) VC heterogeneity (R8).  The dependent variable in all models except models R4 and R6 is VC overconfidence. 
The dependent variables in models R4 and R6 are the funding decision and the expected series B valuation respectively.
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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tion in the next round is an important judgment call that VCs
need to make while investing as overvaluations may seriously
hurt their governance control and profitability.
An important strength of this research lies in our use of uni-
que data collected specifically for the purpose of this study in
a highly consequential domain of IT investments.  Our oner-
ous data collection effort has enabled us to create an extensive
list of control variables to rule out potential confounding
effects.  The reliability of our measure of IT knowledge was
tested by using the split half method, and the robustness of the
results gives us confidence in the findings we report for the
effect of IT knowledge.
Our work sheds light on the debate among the venture capital
community on the role of IT knowledge for assessing IT
investments.  Most VCs investing in IT ventures do not have
formal education in IT and, by and large, have worked in one
of three professions:  as lawyers, as investment bankers, or as
management consultants.  Our work shows that VCs with low
IT knowledge are not only overconfident in their decisions,
but also fail to correct their tendency to be overconfident even
when strongly motivated to do so, for example, when making
big funding decisions.  Even though VCs do not have to write
any code for the technical product they fund, low IT knowl-
edge is a disadvantage compared to even moderate IT
knowledge.  Moreover, moderate IT knowledge has an added
benefit of helping VCs resist the biasing effects of past suc-
cesses.  In fact, VCs with moderate IT knowledge are less
likely to be overconfident following successful funding deci-
sions compared to both VCs with low and high IT knowledge. 
An implication for the venture capital industry is that VCs
should periodically assess their level of IT knowledge using
reliable instruments, and strive to develop their knowledge
base.  Besides, VCs who determine that they are highly
knowledgeable have to be cautioned against quick, untested,
intuitive judgments because taking time to question the limits
of what they know may help them develop a more accurate
understanding of what they know and counter overconfidence
for these VCs.  Indeed, experts in many domains, from chess
to investment, take time to develop more accurate self-insight
through coaching, for example.
Interestingly, we did not find any indication of influence of IT
experience on overconfidence even after controlling for a
potential nonlinear effect of IT experience.  Ours is not the
only study to report this.  Extant studies have reported a
similar observation:  VCs’ overconfidence may not depend on
their experience (Acs and Audretsch 2006; Zacharakis and
Shepherd 2001).  The explanation for this nonsignificant
effect might be that VCs who are technically more knowl-
edgeable can better recognize an increasing gap between new
technical developments and their knowledge.  Realizing the
gap in their knowledge, technically more knowledgeable VCs
may spend more time than the rest to stay abreast of new
technical advancements.  This could be a possible reason why
we do not see any statistical effect of IT experience on VCs.
This study has a few limitations as well.  One of these has to
do with the fact that not all mediators of the effects we postu-
lated could be measured.  So, when we hypothesized that it is
the self-attribution bias that leads VCs to become more
overconfident following successful funding decisions, we
tested only the net result of the prediction—the relationship
between past successes and overconfidence—but more
detailed experimental studies are needed to test the mediating
mechanism.   Another limitation of this study is that it focuses
only on antecedents of VCs’ overconfidence.  Future studies
should explore how VCs’ overconfidence affects their
financial performance.
To conclude, our work presents a richer and a more nuanced
picture of the role of knowledge for decision making, and the
effect of IT knowledge on the overconfidence of VCs in their
IT investments in particular.  By examining nonlinear effects
of IT knowledge, we offered a novel explanation for the con-
tradictory findings concerning the role of knowledge in
previous research, as well as pointed out potential pitfalls for
VCs with both low and high IT knowledge.   By examining
the interaction effects of IT knowledge, we shed light on new
reasons behind the assertion that IT knowledge is an impor-
tant qualification of VCs investing in the IT domain.
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